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Brain-Control Interfaces in The Coming Age of Trans- 
humans: Philosophical and Regulatory Mappings 
AAYUSH SHANKAR1 
This article discusses the Philosophical and Regulatory mappings of Brain Control 
Interfaces in the coming age of Trans-humans. The author combines perspectives 
from Material Engagement theory, Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological 
perspective and Veerback’s cyborg intentionality on human-technology relations 
and juxtaposes this post-phenomenological hybrid-intentionality on upcoming 
BCI such as Neuralink. Taking the hybrid-intentionality as point of departure, the 
author then develops Regulatory approaches and principles in context of the 
normative harms borne out of such transfiguration while also highlighting these 
key harms. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is said that the First person shooter gamer who uses a mouse does 
not sense the mouse, but the absence or presence of objects in the virtual 
environment. The mouse which offers the benefit of exploration for the 
                                                          
1 Aayush Shankar is a Law Graduate (2020) of Symbiosis Law School,NOIDA. The views of the 
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gamer is forgotten in itself.2 With time and practice, optimum tactile 
feedback is projected through the mouse and the gaming device, making it 
immersive for the gamer to make kill-streaks in the match. The Body Schema 
extends to incorporate the mouse, and peripheral sense is somehow acquired 
in the gaming environment. In short, the brain treats the mouse as if it was 
an organ of body itself.  
The above thought experiment raises provocative questions: Where 
does our ‘being’ end and the virtual world begin? How does this mediate the 
experience of the world for their users? Where do we draw the line between a 
human being, and the material world? Is the mouse a means to our end or is 
it part of ourselves? The evolution of human intelligence, especially with the 
realistic potential of realization of Trans-humans, hinges on these questions 
that infer the direction of causality between biology and culture. 
To explore these concerns, I combine perspectives from the material 
engagement theory, Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological perspective, 
Heidegger’s ontic dimensionality, and Veerback’s cyborg intentionality on 
human-technology relations to build a hybrid intentionality framework for 
Neuralink and other types of BCI. Taking the hybrid intentionality as point of 
departure, I then attempt to develop regulatory principles to ensure 
appropriate oversight that address any potential ethical and moral concerns 
while simultaneously minimizing the risk of normative harms borne out of 
such transfiguration. 
II.  BCI – JUXTAPOSITION WITH IHDE’S POST-PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK, MATERIAL ENGAGEMENT THEORY & VEERBACK’S CYBORG 
INTENTIONALITY 
Human beings, since their genesis, have been altering the paths of their 
evolution by creating and manipulating novel material forms leading to the 
possibilities of material engagement.3 The foundational premise of Idhe’s 
Phenomenological Human Technology Relations framework is that we 
‘become’ through making and using technologies that shape our minds and 
extend our bodies, i.e. we make tools and tools in turn make us. Contra to the 
                                                          
2 See generally MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI. FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE. (Harper 
& Row 1990); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (C. Smith trans., 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1962) (1945). 
3 Don Ihde & Lambros Malafouris, Homo faber Revisited: Postphenomenology and Material 
Engagement Theory 32 Philos Technol. 195 195–214 (2019). [Hereinafter HomoFaber]. 
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Neo-Darwinian view4 that we are organisms of ‘nature’, ‘biology’ or 
‘culture’, Ihde conceives our human mode of being as a continuum of 
human-prosthesis inter-relations.5 This conception does not in any way 
imply our dissonance with other animals or organisms.6 At the essence of this 
conception lies the simple fact: human beings besides adapting to the 
environment are also changing them.7  
The age-old dialectic between man and his tools have been recognised 
and interpreted across various disciplines apart from the contrarian notion 
that humans and things are co-constituted. Technology, in its sociological 
form, as derived from the thought of Marx Weber, was said to play in the role 
of disenchantment of nature and the desacralizing of the earth.8 It was said 
to be the prime cause of the decline of Kultur.9 It raises further existential 
points of inquiry. In Husserl, a certain emphasis is placed on embodiment; 
the role of “Praxical” and perceptual experience.10 What does Idhe means 
when he says that technologies make us as much as we make technology? 
Idhe’s post phenomenological framework places emphasis on the 
phenomenon of ‘technological embodiment’11 and on the types of skill, Praxis 
and self-consciousness.12 We have evolved by manipulating our environment 
to create new materials.13 (from marbles, stones & ceramic to wood, metals, 
silicon, plastic). Intelligence in its originality, stripped of all the pride, 
consists of the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, specifically the 
                                                          
4 See generally CHARLES DARWIN. THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, OR THE 
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (J Murray ed., 6th ed. 1872). 
5 See Don Ihde, Postphenomenological re-embodiment. 17 Foundations of Science, 373 373–
377 (2012). 
6 Id., at 197. 
7 Homfaber at 196. 
8 DON IDHE’S, TECHNICS & PRAXIS: A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY (Springer 1979th ed. 1978). 
[Hereinafter Praxis]. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See JEFFREY YOSHIMI, HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY, A UNIFYING INTERPRETATION. (Springer 1st ed. 
2016). 
11 See DON IHDE, D. TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIFEWORLD: FROM GARDEN TO EARTH. (3rd. ed. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990). 
12 See Don IHDE. POSTPHENOMENOLOGY AND TECHNOSCIENCE: THE PEKING UNIVERSITY LECTURES (New 
York: State University of New York Press 2009). 
13 See Lambros Malafouris, Metaplasticity and the human becoming: principles of 
neuroarchaeology. 88 Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 49 49–72(2010); See also LAMBROS 
MALAFOURIS, Knapping intentions and the marks of the mental, in THE COGNITIVE LIFE OF THINGS: 
RECASTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE MIND 13 13–22 (L. Malafouris & C. Renfrew eds., Cambridge: 
McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research (2010); Lambros Malafouris, Grasping the 
concept of number: How did the sapient mind move beyond approximation? in THE ARCHAEOLOGY 
OF MEASUREMENT: COMPREHENDING HEAVEN, EARTH AND TIME IN ANCIENT SOCIETIES 35 35–43 (C. 
Renfrew & I. Morley eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010). 
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ability to make tools to make tools, and indefinitely causing variations in the 
manufacture.14 In fact, the foundational premise of Material Engagement 
Theory is that functional anatomy of human intelligence is a dynamic 
construct remodelled in detail by behaviourally important experiments.15 
Recognition of the galvanizing power and potential of technical mediation, 
on how we see ourselves while trying to figure out the world, lies at the 
intersection of material engagement theory and post-phenomenology.16 
Parallels can also be found in the transactional ontology of the relationship 
between mind and material world in the discipline of philosophy and 
cognitive science.17 
Idhe dives into the phenomenology of human machine relationship 
and divides this synergy between human beings with tools/technologies into 
four categories, namely embodiment relations, hermeneutic relations, alterity 
relations and background relations. 
EMBODIMENT RELATIONS 
Idhe, before entering into the realm of dealing with convention of, 
invention of, building of, other possible human machine relations discusses 
the expanse of the pre-phenomological human-machine relations with 
which are faced in our everyday life.18 The penetration of technology can be 
realized once we reflect consciously on our everyday routine.19 We will find 
ourselves in the pervasiveness and diaspora of techno-zone everywhere that 
is undertaken in our daily lives.20  
Let’s take a very specific example from my every day pre-
phenomenological encounter with the machines. I take a pencil and write 
something on a notebook. If I carefully scrutinize my experience, I will find 
that the pencil that I used to write on the page lets me experience the page 
                                                          
14 HENRI BERGSON, CREATIVE EVOLUTION (Arthur Mitchell trans., Cosimo Classics 3rd ed. 2005) 
(1911). 
15 Karenleigh Overmann, Materiality in Numerical cognition: Material Engagement Theory and 
the counting technologies of the Ancient Near East. DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford. 
(2016). 
16 Ihde, supra note 4, at 03. 
17  FRANCISCO J. VARELA, ELEANOR ROSCH AND EVAN THOMPSON THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE. (Cambridge: MIT Press 1991); ANDY CLARK, BEING THERE: 
PUTTING BRAIN, BODY, AND WORLD TOGETHER AGAIN (Cambridge: MIT Press 1997); ANTHONY P 
CHEMERO RADICAL EMBODIED COGNITIVE SCIENCE. (Cambridge MIT Press 2011); DANIEL D. HUTTO, 
AND ERIK MYIN, E. RADICALIZING ENACTIVISM: BASIC MINDS WITHOUT CONTENT (Cambridge: MIT 
Press 2013); Shaun Gallagher ENACTIVIST INTERVENTIONS: RETHINKING THE MIND (Oxford 
University Press 2017). 
18 Praxis, at 6.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Praxis, at 7. 
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(features like textures, softness). The intentional extension of my being is 
transmitted into the paper via the pencil (terminus) and I discover that touch 
is also a distance sense. On the phenomenological level, the pencil is only 
secondarily an object, while more primarily it is transformed into my 
experience as extension of myself. The tool is an ‘intermediary’ between me 
and what is experienced, and is in this sense a ‘means’ of experience in the 
primary focus.21  Idhe represented this in the following notation: 
(Human-machine) -> World  
Similar relations can be felt across widespread human-machine 
relations. The seasoned car driver when parallel parking needs very little by 
way of visual clues to place the car in the small place – in fact, he ‘feels’ the 
extension of himself through the car as the car becomes the symbiotic 
extension of his own embodiness.22 Idhe has named such kind of relations as 
‘embodiment relations.’ Embodiment relations are those in which the 
machine acts as a mediator between my object of experience, and this is in 
contrast to my ordinary experience in the “flesh”.23 This relation result in the 
reduction of my experience in certain ways. First, this is clearly a reduction 
of my full range of my globally sensory experience of the other, i.e. there is a 
quasi or transformed presence. This phenomenological description can have 
vital repercussions when we are considering Brain-Machine Interface 
devices like Neuralink. What is important is emphasise in the difference 
between naked sensory experience and machine-mediated experience, is 
that there is cross-sorting which leads to proliferation of ambiguity in 
relation to the interacting agents.24 The world comes to become a spectacle 
taking us away from its unsullied purity.25 
HERMENEUTIC RELATIONS & HEIDEGGER’S ONTOLOGICAL 
DIMENSIONALITY 
Idhe describes Hermeneutic relation is the second category of 
relationship wherein we move from experiencing through machines to 
experiencing of machines.26 For example, let us consider the techno-laden 
environment existing in an automobile manufacturing factory.27 I will come 
across a basement that is filled with dials, gauges, robotic arms, switches and 
other equipment. On most occasions, the worker sitting in the control centre 
                                                          
21 Praxis, at 8. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Praxis, at 9. 
24 Praxis, at 11. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Praxis, at 12. 
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monitors all the heating and cooling systems and functioning of the robotic 
arms. The worker in this case ‘reads’ the dials to see the arms are functioning 
normally, and if they aren’t, he merely has to turn a dial and see if the arms 
are beginning to turn to normal. Here the engineer is engaged in the 
experiences of a machine. Idhe modelled this relationship as: 
Human  (machine-World) 
Metaphorically speaking, hermeneutic relations are like text in a novel. 
I may read an author but the author is indirectly present in the text.28 It is 
precisely in these situations that Kafkaesque situations may arise.29 For 
example, consider the situation in which the dial has gone faulty and the 
worker thinks that robotic arm is going right instead of it going left. It is 
precisely the instruments, which probe the ultramicroscopic worlds of the 
atom and leave room for doubt as to what is precisely is ‘on the side’ of the 
machine.30 In case of hermeneutic relation, our object of attention is the 
artefact while conversely in the case of embodiment relations the artefact 
acts as a mediator at our natural object of attention.31  
Similarly, Heidegger too goes one step ahead, and applies his 
ontological comprehension of truth (Truth is revelation of some ‘obscureness’ 
that is bought to presence within some opening which itself has a form) to 
machines and says that technology has a priori ontological relation to 
Science.32 Contrary to existing notion that technology is a means to our end, 
his ready to hand reasoning is of the form that the world is revealed through 
the (a) equipmental context; (b) equipmental context is the condition of the 
possibility of the specific tools which they are; (c) equipment of hand through 
readiness-to-hand reveals existential intentionality and (d) context is taken 
holistically conception.33 Essentially, in hermeneutic relations, the machine 
becomes the ‘other’, as a focal object of experience thus leading to 
unintended and unimaginable possibilities.34 Heidegger does not merely 
trace this revelation to a dimension -specific equipmental context. For 
example, a light bulb in a room subsumes the darkness, a covered road-side 




31 Richard Heersmink, Ghost in the Machine, A philosophical analysis of the relationship between 
brain-computer interface applications and their users, 2008, at 60. [Hereinafter Ghost]. 
32 Id., at 126. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ghost, at 12. 
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bus stop takes account of the rain and thereby alters the holistic reality in the 
proces.   
By application of Heidegger’s ontological dimesionality of technology, 
it can be safely said that BCI like Neuralink would provide the equipmental 
context for the realization and revelation of our existential intentionality in 
the coming future. A fortiori, we will discover parts of ourselves that has been 
hidden to us since time being. 
ALTERITY RELATIONS 
This relationship is concerned with how we relate to technology as 
another being.35 This otherness remains a quasi-otherness.36 The threshold of 
this otherness remains weaker than the one we experience with animals. So 
if we see someone posting a status with their earphones, it signifies a strong 
alterity relations of the user with their technology. This is why we have a 
tendency to personalize our assets and we are enthralled by technologies that 
are like us.37 Idhe denoted denoted it as38:- 
Human -> Technology 
The stronger our affiliation, the greater the alterity relation is.39 That 
is why we seem to personalize our devices to our liking and have an intuitive 
regard for certain types of technologies that remind us of ourselves. Robots 
also fit into the same criteria. We have different kinds of alterity relation with 
different kinds of technologies.  
BACKGROUND RELATIONS 
This is the kind of relationship in which tools/machines are pushed 
into the background.40 For example, technologies like lighting, heating and 
cooling systems & washing machine operate without any human 
intervention in the context of their functionality. Generally, it does not 
require direct human intervention, although they do condition the holistic 
context in we live. Idhe proposed the following notation for it41:- 
                                                          
35 Ghost, at 61. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Aboulafia, Mitchell, "George Herbert Mead", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed.) Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/mead (last visited Jan 12 2021); See also 
ERVIN GOFFMAN PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Anchor 1959). 
38 Ghost, at 63. 
39 Ihde, supra note 10. 
40 Ghost, at 62. 
41 Ghost, at 63. 
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(Machine-world) – Human 
As pointed out above, devices like Neuralink that extract brain activity 
of the user and convert it into command signal for current applications like 
motorized wheelchairs, prosthesis and computers and many more potential 
applications advance the embodiment relations of machines with our human 
senses.42 While manipulating devices with our thoughts remain still in the 
sphere of fiction, BCI technologies are being used today for medical reasons 
while possessing the potential for far-reaching applications.43  
VEERBACK’S CYBORG INTENTIONALITY 
Veerback’s concept of cyborg intentionality, specifically Hybrid 
intentionality is relevant when we want to build a conceptual hybrid 
framework for Neuralink.44 Veerback essentially contextualizes the term, 
‘cyborg’ and makes the point about the human intentionality that is 
constituted by technology.45 His cyborg intentionality is classified into three 
types:- 
 Mediated intentionality – This is used to express the 
phenomena that most of the relations we have with the world around 
us is either directed at or facilitated by technological devices and 
artefacts.46 Parallels of this category can be drawn to Idhe’s concept of 
embodiment relations.47 
 Hybrid intentionality – This category refers to the actual 
merging, rather than any intermediated interaction, of the human with 
the technological.48  
 Composite intentionality – This category refers to the 
“addition” or “interplay” between human intentionality and 
intentionality of technological artefacts themselves.49 For example, the 
thermostats’ directness with respect to measuring temperature 
                                                          
42 Ghost, at 9. 
43 See Shih JJ, Krusienski DJ, Wolpaw JR. Brain-computer interfaces in medicine 87 (3) Mayo Clin 
Proc 268 268-279 (2012). 
44 Peter Paul Verbeek, Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human–
technology Relations 7(3) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 387–395 (2008). 
[Hereinafter Cyborg Int]. 
45 Homofaber, at 208. 
46 Homofaber, at 208. 
47 Praxis, at 8. 
48 Homofaber, at 208. 
49 Ibid. 
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enables human directness with respect to determining the temperature 
of the ecosystem.50  
In the context of BCI like Nerualink, Veerback’s concept of Hybrid 
intentionality seems to be squarely applicable as the BCI will require an 
interplay between human intentionality and intentionality of the interface of 
invasive electrodes that could potentially alter cognitive processes. 
Moreover, this will also enable computer devices & human brain to transfer 
information in both the directions. It is in that process that there would be 
invocation of brain states with invasive electrodes that would relate to certain 
mental representations which would thus create hybrid intentionality.  
What is fascinating is that for the first time we would invoke cognitive 
process by artificial means going beyond our senses to acquire information.51 
The far sighted implication of such a hybrid state would be that we wouldn’t 
need our senses anymore to obtain information. This hybrid intentionality 
would represent a “sixth sense” that could have drastic consequences for the 
structuring of our cognitive system.52 This could be akin to a situation 
wherein we are plugged in to a machine while deriving the maximum 
hedonistic pleasure out of it.53  
III.  NORMATIVE HARMS – TRANSHUMINISTIC CONFIGURATION 
AUTONOMY & PRIVACY 
The Right to be let alone is the foundational premise of the notion of 
privacy54 encompassing the aspect of mental privacy. The idea of mental 
privacy implied that the contents of one’s mind remained hidden to one’s 
mind until they were voluntarily disclosed.55 However, the technological 
advances of today have already led to the impairment of the erosion of this 
mental privacy.56 With the influx of social media platforms and surveillance-
propogating technologies, the inner sanctum of mind has been ontologically 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Ghost, at 74. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ghost, at 75. 
54 Samuel D. Warren; Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy 4 (5) 193 193-220, Harvard Law 
Review (1890). 
55 Adina Roskies, “Neuroethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
Spring 2016 ed.) Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/neuroethics (last visited at Jan 12, 01, 
2021). 
56 Ibid. 
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revealed to the outside world, intruding upon a person’s emotional well-
being.57 
With the potential creation of BCI devices like Neuralink, the threat to 
privacy is not a shallow claim about devices that are able to read our thoughts, 
although this could prove to be a dyastopian scenario in the future.58 Framing 
of the infringment to any potential privacy claim has to be based in an 
empirical grounded evaluation of the real nature of threat. For example, 
devices that ascertain honesty or dishonesty based on brain-patterns raise a 
host of legal issues in relation of their deployment in employment or as 
evidence in the court-room.59 Similarly, the deployment of Brain-machine 
interface inadvertently leading to hybrid intentionality would also raise 
potential claims about erosion of our mental privacy and thus degrading our 
sense of self and dignity.60  
Another potential concern that could stem from deployment of 
Neuralink is on the person’s sense of autonomy. Autonomy is one of the most 
valuable aspects of personhood.61 Our thoughts and behaviour are 
manipulated indirectly by old worries induced by propaganda and subliminal 
advertising.62 In the same way, devices like Neuralink bear the potential to 
control our threats or behaviour which directly touches on our sense of 
autonomy.63  
SURVEILLANCE & COMMODIFICATION OF INTIMATE DATA  
                                                          
57 Judith DeCew, “Privacy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Ed. ), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.) Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/privacy/ 
(last visited at Jan 12, 01, 2021); See also William Prosser, Privacy, 48(3) California Law 
Review 383 383-423 (1960). 
58 Roskies, supra note 54. 
59 Joshua D Greene , Leigh E Nystrom, Andrew D Engell, John M Darley, Jonathan D Cohen, 
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment 44(2) Neuron 389 389–
400. (2004). 
60 Ibid; See also Adam D. Moore Defining privacy. 39 Journal of Social Philosophy 411 411–428 
(2008); M Roth. CMU knows what’s on your mind Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (2009) Retrieved 
January 4, 2009, Retrieved from http://www.post-gazette.com/science/2009/01/04/CMU-
knows-what-s-on-your-mind/ stories/200901040263 (last visited at Jan 12, 01, 2021); I 
Sample, Mind-reading program translates brain activity into words, The Guardian. (2012). 
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/jan/31/mind-reading-
program-brain-words (last visited at Jan 12, 01, 2021); P. R Wolpe, Is My Mind Mine? Forbes 
(2009). Retrieved September 10, 2009, from 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/09/neuroimaging-neuroscience-mind-reading-opinions 
contributors-paul-root-wolpe. html. (last visited Jan 12, 01, 2021). 
61 Roskies, supra note 54; See also A. RIP STEIN. EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW. 
(Cambridge University Press, New York 1999). 
62 Roskies, supra note 54. 
63 Ibid. 
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Haggerty and Ericson proposed the concept of surveillance assemblage 
for which they have contextualized the idea of assemblages as proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari.64 The post-panoptic assemblage is directed towards 
hybrids – technology-information assemblage and therefore this concept 
could be squarely deployed to criticize the neo-liberal control implications of 
devices like Neuralink.65 The device bears the potential of expanding profit & 
control by corporations who will benefit from the sharing and transmission 
of data.66 This device could then be deployed by the interested stakeholders 
for the purpose of technologically controlling and disciplining workers while 
the corporations that exercise control over such device would profit from 
such an arrangement. New structures of power and knowledge would be 
produced when an individual’s thought and behaviour is being modulated 
and altered before he knows it himself.67 
THOUGHT-POLICE – INTERFERENCE WITH LIBERTY 
Neuroscience intervention can affect out primal instincts, desires, 
moods, impulses and other elements that are regarded as basic and have the 
potential to alter the meaning and quality of the most intimate aspect of our 
lives.68 Our brains are a proximal cause of who we are and what we do. One of 
the conception of personal identity hinges on what makes one person 
numerically identical to another person at another time.69 Per Hart, it is our 
organic shared history that makes us who we are.70 However, with devices like 
Neuralink there could be imposition of artificial psychological continuity for 
two human beings for the benefit of corporations. The modulation of our 
                                                          
64 Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant assemblage 51(4) British Journal of 
Sociology, 605 605–622 (2000); See also Masa Galic & Tjerk Timan, Bentham, Deleuze and 
Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance Theories from the Panopticon 30 (1) Philosophy & 
Technology 9 9-37 (2017). 
65 Galic ibid. 
66 See Karim Jebari Brain Machine Interface and Human Enhancement – An Ethical Review 6 
Neuroethics 617-625 (2013); See also Ienca, M. & Haselager, P. Hacking the brain: Brain–
computer interfacing technology and the ethics of neurosecurity. 18(2) Ethics and Information 
Technology, 117 117–129. (2016).   
67 See Shoshana Zuboff Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information 
civilization. 30 Journal of Information Technology, 75 75–89 (2015); See also Bellamy Foster, 
J. & McChesney, R.W. Surveillance Capitalism: Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military-
Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age. 66(3) Monthly Review (2014). 
68 Roskies, supra note 54. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See H.L.A HART CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford Claredon Press 1961); See also ERIC T OLSON, THE 
HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY (New York: Oxford University Press. 
1999). 
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thought leads to loss of our agency and is an indirect infringement of our 
liberty.  
IV.  BCI - REGULATORY APPROACHES & PRINCIPLES  
In the realm of the interposition of ethics and innovative technologies, 
the challenge in regards to a regulatory framework does not depend upon in 
providing solutions of new & unexplored issues but in dealing with 
limitations of regulatory systems that developed over the years and ensuring 
their effectiveness.71 Any regulatory intervention should focus on the 
identification of leverage points (specific-jurisdiction) at which precisely to 
intervene.72 In the context of novel technologies, this would involve the 
nuances in the identification of how far and how well the existing regulatory 
technologies would apply to BCI devices like Neuralink.73 The precise points 
where the regulatory framework is being constricted or bottlenecked, 
interventions should be applicable.74 This can be achieved by mapping the 
landscape of these regimes and the responsible authorities involved in such 
an intervention.75 Afterwards, there should be a jurisdiction-wise specific 
analysis in consideration of the fact that whether these the regime is 
ensuring effective and proportionate oversight or not? The scope of framework 
should cover the ambit of innovators, manufacturers, subjects as well as the 
respective economic interests of stakeholders interested in the design and 
delivery of stakeholders.76 Finally, the ultimate objective of the regulatory 
framework should be to deliver the benefits of the innovation with minimum 
regulatory burdens so long as requirements of proportionality and safety are 
being met.77 
Moreover, BCI technologies like Neuralink involve the complex 
architecture of technologies, risks and benefits in the implementation of 
novel technologies & therefore it is impractical to lay down a set of 
prescriptive principles and expect them to be carried down. The agrandizzing 
hype about potential of BCI in light of practical utilitarian need raise 
considerable conoundrums for policymakers. The Regulatory framework 
concerning BCI should consist of three criteria; firstly the underlying 
                                                          
71 Ghost, at 131. 
72 See Donella Meadows & Diana Wright THINKING IN SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 145 (Chelsea Green 
Publishing Co. 2015). 
73 Ghost, at 131. 
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principles driving the framework, secondly the normative basis of virtue 
underpinning any plan of action or intervention78 and thirdly the interests & 
the policy goals associated with unintended consequences resulting from the 
application of the device as discussed above. 
FOUNDATIONAL & UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES  
There is a constant flux between the benefits and the uncertainty which 
lies at the root of our framework. While the emotional distress and turmoil 
caused by brain disorders entail the necessity of an effective intervention, 
however on the other hand, there is an ambiguity about the proclaimed 
benefits and repercussions associated with BCI.79 This ambiguity arises due 
to the lack of any comprehensive understanding regarding the functioning of 
the brain.80 Correspondingly, the foundational principles must inculcate 
beneficence of intervention by these technologies only when the applicable 
benefits have been demonstrated to sufficiently apply while simultaneously 
providing for caution on account of uncertainty in the potential benefits of 
applicability. Moreover, any regulatory framework should mitigate any risks 
associated with the hedonistic pleasure as derived from the virtual 
experience provided by Neuralink, although Nozick argues that humans 
value the contact with reality in itself as we actually want to ‘do’ things rather 
than simply having the experience of doing them.81  
NORMATIVE BASIS : VIRTUE GUIDED APPROACH 
Any meaningful policy framework must be reinforced with principles 
of virtues.82 Aristotelian ethics form the basis of virtue ethics, that places 
particular emphasis on moral character.83 The elements of virtue that should 
guide policymakers include84 :- 
                                                          
78 Ghost, at 19. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ghost, at 75; See also ROBERT NOZICK ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA. 42-45. (Basic Books 1974). 
82 Aayush, Tech-Policy | Policy Risk Assessment: Neuralink & Brain Control Interfaces Retrieved 
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Philosophy, (Edward N. Zalta ed. winter 2018 Edition URL = 
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Square London WC1B 3JS 2013). [Hereinafter BCI Report]. 
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 Inventinvess – It must be exercised through, among 
another means, technological means by identifying the approaches 
that provide wider access to the beneficiaries of the technology. 
 Humility – Acknowleding the limits of the technological 
progress and a realistic capability of the technology to alleviate brain 
disorders & other potential benefits. 
 Responsibility – Refraining from aggrandizzing claims 
about the premature applications of such technologies.85 
Moreover, the reasons why a virtue-guided approach should be 
preferred are as follows :- 
 First, a virtue-enabled approach enables the balance in 
light of the overarching need and the flexibility that a policy framework 
requires.86 
 Second, the idea of virtue ethics itself implies the necessity 
to use practical judgement to come up with a response that is 
appropriate to the particular approach required.87 
 Third, virtue ethics proliferates and promotes 
interventions not as neo-liberal controllers of our brains but as 
individuals with particular values, desires, relationships and 
aspirations.88 
A virtue guided approach will enable us not only to do the right thing 
but incorporate our actions in the wider ambit of altruistic perceptions, 
humble priorities and over-arching values. 
POLICY GOALS & INTERESTS – SAFETY, PRIVACY, AUTONOMY & 
EQUITY 
In light of the risks associated with the unforeseeable impacts of BCI 
during their development, five interests should provide the necessary 
protection.89 These interests should ensure the minimization of any potential 
harm resulting from privacy & autonomy, both at individual decision-making 
level and in the wider context of subject’s life.90 The market access of BCI 
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86 Aayush, supra note 81.  
87 Ibid. 
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89 BCI Report, at xix. 
90 Ibid. 
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should be determined in consideration of equity while diminishing any 
stigma while promoting and protecting public understanding and trust in 
respect to the safety of the device.91 What is also important is how we frame 
the policy problem with respect to each of the policy goals.92 
V.  PROBLEM FRAMING & RECOMMENDATIONS 
SAFETY – The unintended consequences arising out of the applications 
of BCI could include their ill impact on health & cognitive brain functions.93 
The presence of foreign objects inside the brain carries associated risks.94 
RECOMMENDATIONS – Onus of responsibility should be placed on the 
developers to provide cogent proof that takes into account the risk/benefit 
ration with available treatment options.95 Moreover, the regulatory 
framework should ensure that there is proper publication and dissemination 
of evidence that is accessible to general public conveying safety in clear and 
unequivocal terms.96 
AUTONOMY & PRIVACY – Disruption in our understanding of the 
notion of free-will97 as well as disruption of autonomy due to brain disease or 
injury. Information collected from BCI can be used for identification of 
subject or other discriminatory purposes.98 External breach or data theft 
could have serious repercussions that could have far-reaching impact on the 
utility of the device.99 
RECOMMENDATIONS – Promoting the subject’s understanding of his 
autonomy by offering him informed consent.100 Development of best 
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practices privacy standards by developers that should adhere to applicable 
data protection standards in the jurisdiction for collection and dissemination 
of subject’s data. Adoption of security standards to protect the device from 
any external interference, the failure of which could undermine the utility of 
the device besides the loss of self-reliance by the subject.101 
EQUITY - Accessibility and availability of device only to the citizens of 
the upper strata of the society.102 Moreover, selective treatment can be a cause 
of discrimination for those who live with neurological & mental health issues 
as long as these interventions remain novel.103 
RECOMMENDATIONS – The stakeholders should work together to 
come up with jurisdiction specific models that combat social discrimination 
against individuals at societal level.104 Also, the model for funding should 
reflect close association between scientific community, the industry & non-
governmental organisations.105  
TRUST - Hype and grandstanding that decreases trust & confidence in 
BCI if the promises are not matched in reality.106 Challenges among 
developers and researchers for conveyance of the limits of current 
technology in order to secure informed consent to potential users in the 
backdrop of hype and glitter.107 
RECOMMENDATIONS – Developers should cultivate responsible 
communication practices with respect to the limits of realistic capability of 
BCI. Equally important is the deployment of responsible practices while 
publication of findings by researchers.108 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This idea of Transhumans signify the next stage of human ‘becoming’ 
with the hybrid intentionality at our core. The underlying premise of my 
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perspective on BCI technologies has been that fabrication lies at the heart of 
our existence. We are both changing as well as being changed by innovations 
of technology, the sheer quantity, variety and magnitude of our dependency 
on the techno-material. Human material can be accounted basis technical 
mediation & creative engagement while the resulting oversight should 
ensure appropriate safety and precaution in the regulatory landscape. It’s 
time that we update our understanding of what it means to be human. 
 
